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Compute Project



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ONIE and Secure Boot

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OPEN HARDWARE. **OPEN SOFTWARE.** **OPEN FUTURE.**





ONIE and Secure Boot

March 9th, 2017

Curt Brune | Cumulus Networks


Talk Overview

- A Question of Trust
- Cryptographic Concepts
- Secure Technologies
- Applying it to ONIE



A Question of Trust

- Trusting Hardware
 - CPU
 - FPGA / CPLD
 - Boot Firmware
- Trusting Software
 - ONIE
 - Network OS Installer
 - Network OS Runtime



Security and Cryptographic Concepts

- Lots of Terminology
- Lots of Specifications
- Lots of Jargon





Security and Cryptographic Building Blocks

- Secure Hash (Digest)

- `digest = sha256(message)`

- Hash Extend

- `A = hash(original A || message)`

- Public / Private Key Crypto

- `encrypt(key_public, message) => M'`

- `decrypt(key_private, M') => message`



Digital Signatures


- Creating a Signature, sender
 - `signature = encrypt(key_private, hash(message))`
- Send original message and signature to recipient
- Verifying Signature, recipient
 - `digest = hash(message)`
 - `claimed_digest = decrypt(key_public, signature)`
 - `does (claimed_digest == digest) ??`



Root of Trust, Chain of Trust

- Ultimately a core component of the system is “trusted”
- The trusted core verifies the next stage of the boot process before handing off control
- The next stage continues the trust relationship, verifying the next stage before handing off control
- Repeat


Root of Trust, Chain of Trust, Cont.



Each component verifies the next component

CPU Security Technologies

- Varies by CPU Manufacturer
 - x86_64 - Intel Boot Guard, UEFI, TXT
 - ARM - Trust Zone, UEFI / Verified Boot
 - NXP
 - Thousands of pages of specifications
- All verify digital signatures in one form or another. Forms the root of trust for measurement.



Trusted Platform Module (TPM)

- Does a lot. Thousands of pages of specification.
- Measured Boot
 - Platform Configuration Registers
 - Hash Extend Platform State






Linux Secure Boot on x86_64


- Unified Extensible Firmware Interface (UEFI) firmware
 - Maintains a database of authorized public keys - **kek, db**
 - Maintains a database of blacklisted (revoked) keys - **dbx**
- shimx64.efi
 - Thin EFI application, signed by private key whose public key is in UEFI db
 - Contains a public key for verifying the next stage
 - Verifies and loads next stage
- MokManager.efi
 - Machine Owner Key (MOK) database
 - Supplementary database of keys for verification
 - Used by shimx64.efi during image verification

Linux Secure Boot on x86_64, Cont.




- UEFI verifies shimx64.efi
- shimx64.efi is signed by a private key, whose public key is in the UEFI db

Linux Secure Boot on x86_64, Cont.



- shimx64.efi verifies grubx64.efi using one of:
 - Internal key
 - UEFI db, dbx
 - MOK db, dbx
- Provides verification interface for grubx64.efi to use
- Measures grubx64.efi image and MOK database into TPM PCRs


Linux Secure Boot on x86_64, Cont.



- grubx64.efi verifies Linux kernel
- Uses interface provided by shimx64.efi for verification
 - consults UEFI kek, db, dbx, MOK db, MOK dbx



Linux Secure Boot on x86_64, All Together



- UEFI verifies shimx64.efi
- shimx64.efi verifies grubx64.efi
- grubx64.efi verifies Linux kernel
- Linux kernel verifies kernel modules, etc.



Applying to ONIE

- ONIE is a Linux based operating system
 - Linux Kernel
 - initramfs
- The ONIE Secure Boot flow will follow the shim model
 - ONIE shimx64.efi
 - ONIE grubx64.efi
 - ONIE kernel and initramfs



ONIE Image Discovery Waterfall - NEW

- Locate an installer via the image discovery waterfall
 - Local file
 - DHCP options
 - etc...
- **NEW** - Verify the signature on the installer before execution
 - UEFI kek, db, dbx
 - MOK db, dbx
 - Continue waterfall if verification fails
- Execute the Installer
 - NOS installer prepares its NOS for Secure Boot



Collaboration and Input Needed

- Open Questions and Details:
 - What about secure firmware updates?
 - Build system modifications
 - PKI, Certificate Authorities and key management

Further Reading

- Unified Extensible Firmware Interface Specification
 - Version 2.6, January 2016, <http://www.uefi.org/>
- Platform Initialization Specification: Volume 1
 - Pre-EFI Initialization Core Interface
 - Version 1.5, July 2016, <http://www.uefi.org/>
- TCG PC Client Platform Firmware Profile Specification
 - Level 00 Revision 00.21, March 30, 2016
 - <https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/>
- TCG PC Client Specific TPM Interface Specification
 - Version 1.3, 21 March 2013
 - <https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/>



Thank you!

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